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Walden Bello*
The Global Crisis of Legitimacy
of Liberal Democracy
iN MY book, DiLEMMAs oF DoMiNATioN, i identify three dimen-
sions of the crisis of liberal democracy. The first is the crisis of overex-
tension, or the growing gap between imperial reach and imperial grasp, 
the most striking example of which is the Us’s being drawn into a quag-
mire in iraq. This has led to an erosion of its strategic position globally 
and made the threat of the employment of Us military force to dis-
cipline recalcitrant governments and forces throughout the world less 
credible than it was three years ago. hugo Chavez’ scintillating defiance 
of American power would not be possible without the iraqi resistance’s 
successfully pinning down Us interventionist forces in a war without 
end. The second is the crisis of overproduction, overaccumulation, or 
overcapacity. This refers to the growing gap between the tremendous 
productive capacity of the global capitalist system and the limited global 
demand for the commodities produced by this system. The result has 
been, over time, drastically lowered growth rates in the central econo-
mies, stagnation, and a crisis of profitability. Efforts by global capital 
to regain profitability by more intensively exploiting labor in the North 
or moving out to take advantage of significantly lower wages elsewhere 
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have merely exacerbated the crisis. on the one hand, neoliberal policies 
in the North and structural adjustment programs in the south have gut-
ted global demand. on the other hand, the export of capital has created 
massive new industrial capacity in China and selected other countries. 
New productive capacity and stagnant if not declining global demand is 
the recipe for the exacerbation of the crisis of profitability. 
one indicator of the deepening crisis of profitability is that com-
petition has replaced cooperation as the dominant aspect of the re-
lationship among global capitalist elites. From the project of globali-
zation that more or less united the global capitalist class during the 
Clinton era, we have entered, in the bush period, into a period of 
intense national or regional capitalist competition. in so far as the 
bush administration adheres to the globalist capitalist project, it is 
that of managed globalization, one that ensures that Us corporate 
interests do not get hurt but become the main beneficiaries of the 
process. Protection for Us corporate interests and free trade for the 
rest of the world- this is the operational dictum of Washington, one 
that is now on display in the Us’s adamant refusal to abide by the 
NAFTA ruling on Canadian softwood imports. Given this nationalist-
protectionist posture on the part of Washington, it is not surprising 
that the WTo talks leading to the sixth Ministerial in hong kong are 
in danger of collapse.
The third dimension of the crisis that i identify is the crisis of legiti-
macy of Us hegemony. This, i think, is as serious as the other two crises, 
since, as an admirer of Gramsci, i do think that legitimacy, more than 
force or the market, is the lynchpin of a system of social relations. one 
dimension of this crisis of legitimacy is the crisis of the multilateral sys-
tem of global economic governance owing to the Us’ no longer wanting 
to act as a primus inter pares, or first among equals, in the WTo, World 
bank, and the iMF, and its wishing to unilaterally pursue its interests 
through these mechanisms, thus seriously impairing their credibility, 
legitimacy, and functioning as global institutions. Another dimension of 
this crisis of legitimacy is the crisis of Lockean democracy, that model 
of democratic rule that the Us has promoted as the system of self-rule 
both in the North and in the south. i would like to focus the rest of my 
talk on this dimension of the crisis of hegemony. 
Lockean democracy is in crisis throughout the whole world today. 
This is ironic, given the fact that just over a decade ago, liberal democ-
racy American-style was supposed to sweep everything before it. how 
different from the Fukuyaman end-of-history mood is the sense of cri-
sis today, one that the thinker Richard Rorty captures quite well in his 
comment: “in the worst case scenario, historians will someday have to 
explain why the golden age of Western democracy, like the age of the 
Antonines, lasted only about two hundred years” (Rorty, 2004: 10). 
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Let me begin with the United states. There, the “democracy” in 
liberal democracy has long been put into question by the massive hi-
jacking of elections by corporate financing that has corrupted both 
the Republican and Democratic parties and the systematic disenfran-
chisement of poor people symbolized by the Florida elections of 2000 
and the ohio elections of 2004. 
There, corporate rule has reached its apogee with George W. bush 
doing the bidding of Us industry in torpedoing the kyoto Protocol, 
awarding his vice president’s corporate allies such as halliburton with 
no-bid contracts, going to war for his oil cronies, and creating a free-
market paradise for Us corporations in iraq. 
There, the military establishment has become so unaccountable 
to its nominal civilian superiors that one cannot but agree with Wil-
liam Pfaff when he writes, “The United states is not yet eighteenth 
century Prussia, when the military owned the state, [but] the threat is 
more serious than most Americans realize” (Pfaff, 2001). 
There, the “liberal” in liberal democracy has been subverted by 
a Patriot Act that eliminates many of the few barriers that had re-
mained between the individual and total monitoring and control by 
big brother. The Patriot Act is best described by harvard Professor 
Elaine scarry as “a gigantic license to search and seize that violates 
the Fourth Amendment” (scarry, 2004: 12).
What is clear is that what prides itself as the first modern democ-
racy has ceased to be a model for the rest of the world. What i would 
like to dwell on a bit is the state of democracy in the developing world. 
Just a decade ago, we were supposed to be in the midst of samuel 
huntington’s so called “third wave” of democratization, as country 
after country in Latin America, Asia, and Africa threw off ruling dic-
tatorships and adopted variants of the Anglo-American democratic 
model. Today the recurrent question is: are we undergoing a reversal 
of that wave? Let me take as an example of the changing fortunes of 
democracy the situation in my country, the Philippines. 
Whatever Happened to People Power? 
“People power” used to be synonymous with the Philippines. in Feb-
ruary 1986 Filipinos captured the imagination of the world when they 
rushed out to the streets to support a military rising and ousted the 
strongman Ferdinand Marcos. Fifteen years later, in January 2001, 
they again surged to the streets to bring down President Joseph Es-
trada, who was widely believed to be the recipient of hundreds of mil-
lions of pesos from illegal gambling activities. Today, however, they 
are largely absent while another president stands accused, this time of 
stealing elections. 
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intercepted telephone conversations between President Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo and an electoral commissioner during the elections 
of May 2004 showed her attempting to influence the outcome of the 
polls. Unable to deny it was her voice in the taped intercepts, Arroyo 
publicly apologized for a “lapse in judgment”. instead of defusing the 
situation, the admission triggered widespread calls for her to resign. 
in early september 2005, nearly three months after the scandal 
broke, Arroyo blocked a bid to impeach her, clinging to power despite a 
recent poll giving her the lowest overall performance rating among the 
country’s five most recent presidents. Those numbers were not, howev-
er, translated into numbers in the streets. The biggest rally anti-Arroyo 
forces could muster numbered, at most, 40,000. in contrast, hundreds 
of thousands had clogged the main highway running through Manila, 
popularly known as “EDsA”, for days on end in 1986 and 2001. 
What happened, asked Manila’s veteran street activists. Why were 
the people no longer protesting a clear-cut case of electoral fraud by 
a president who was already vastly unpopular owing to ineptitude, 
uninspiring leadership and widely believed allegations of corruption 
even before the telephone intercepts surfaced? 
The truth is that while people dislike Arroyo, they are also deeply 
disillusioned with the political system, which has come to be known 
as the “EDsA state”. Conversations with middle- and lower-class citi-
zens inevitably produce the same answer to why they’re not out dem-
onstrating: “Well, whoever replaces her will probably be as bad, if not 
worse”. intrigued at the discovery that only a handful of students in 
my undergraduate class in political sociology at the University of the 
Philippines, the traditional hotbed of activism, had attended the ral-
lies, i posed to them the question, “is this democracy worth saving?” 
Two thirds said no.
Rather than taking to the streets, people are fleeing in large num-
bers to Europe, the United states and the Middle East. some 10 per-
cent of the Filipino labor force now works overseas, and one out of 
every four Filipinos wants to emigrate. it is estimated that at least 30 
percent of Filipino households now subsist on remittances sent by 8 
million expatriates. 
The widespread cynicism about democracy is understandable, 
especially when Filipinos compare their lot with the Chinese or the 
Vietnamese. some point out bitterly that while authoritarian Vietnam 
reduced the proportion of the population living in extreme poverty 
from 51 percent in 1990 to 10 percent in 2003, the Philippines could 
only bring it down from 20 percent to 14 percent in the same period. 
They decry the fact that at 0.46, the Philippines’ gini coefficient, the 
most reliable measure of inequality, is the worst in southeast Asia. 
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Elite Capture of Democratic Processes 
i think that one key reason for the crisis of democracy in the devel-
oping world is that electoral democracies of the kind favored by the 
West have been extraordinarily vulnerable to being hijacked by elites. 
The system of democracy reestablished in the Philippines after the 
ouster of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986 illustrates the problem. it is 
one that encourages maximum factional competition among the elite 
while allowing them to close ranks against any change in the social 
and economic structure. 
ViPPThe Philippine system is democratic in the narrow sense of 
making elections the arbiter of political succession. in the principle of 
“one man/woman, one vote”, there is formal equality. Yet this formal 
equality cannot but be subverted by its being embedded in a social and 
economic system marked by great disparities of wealth and income. 
Like the American political system on which it is modeled, the 
genius of the Philippine democratic system, from the perspective of 
the elite, is the way it harnesses elections to socially conservative ends 
(bello, 2003: 80-91). Running for office at any level of government is 
prohibitively expensive, so that only the wealthy or those backed by 
wealth can usually stand for elections. Thus the masses do choose 
their representatives but from a limited pool of people of means that 
may belong to different factions-those “in” and those “out” of power 
–but are not different in terms of their political programs. The beauty 
of the system in the eyes of the elite is that by periodically engaging 
the people in an exercise to choose among different members of the 
elite, elections make voters active participants in legitimizing the so-
cial and economic status quo. Thus has emerged the great Philippine 
paradox: an extremely lively play of electoral politics unfolding above 
a class structure that is one of the most immobile in Asia. 
Allowing for institutional and cultural variations, one can say 
that the dynamics of democratic politics in countries such as bra-
zil, Argentina, Mexico, Ecuador, and Thailand are similar to those in 
the Philippines. Elite democracy is one word that some have used to 
describe this system. Polyarchy is another. however, elite capture of 
democratic processes is, in my view, only one factor that subverted the 
performance of the new democracies that emerged in the 1980s. An-
other development was equally critical: their economic promise was 
undermined by the demands of external actors. 
The External Subversion of Democracy 
Let us revisit that historic conjuncture of the early 1980s. The military 
dictatorships were collapsing not only because of internal resistance 
but also because key external actors such as the United states, Euro-
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pean Union, the World bank, and international Monetary Fund (iMF) 
withdrew their support from them. Now, one of the major reasons 
for this about face was that the dictatorships had lost the credibil-
ity, legitimacy, and minimum support to impose the economic reform 
programs, better known as “structural adjustment”, that these influen-
tial forces demanded. Promoted as necessary for economic efficiency, 
these programs were designed to more widely open these economies 
to foreign capital and foreign trade and to enable countries to pay off 
their enormous foreign debts. 
For instance, in brazil and Argentina, tight monetary policies and 
tight fiscal policies drew opposition not only from labor and other civil 
society groupings in the early eighties but also from business groups. 
business interests once benefited from labor-repressive policies im-
posed by these military dictatorships. Now, however, business circles 
began to distance themselves from repressive governments when neo-
liberal policies failed to produce the promised economic growth. As 
stephen haggard and Robert kaufmann observed: 
With economic problems mounting, business elites began to reevalu-
ate the costs and benefits of the technocratic decision-making style 
that characterized authoritarian rule. business groups had complained 
periodically about their lack of access to the remote technocrats who 
conducted macroeconomic policy, but such concerns had been offset 
by particularistic benefits and the fact that governments were willing 
to repress popular sector challenges. The private sector’s gradual dis-
affection did not reflect a democratic epiphany, but a pragmatic re-
sponse to changing circumstances. With authoritarian governments 
increasingly unable to deliver their side of the bargain, “voice” began 
to appear increasingly important to business groups, even if it meant 
reopening the arena to the previously excluded popular sectors” (hag-
gard and kaufman, 1995: 59-60, 192).
The democratic governments which displaced authoritarian regimes 
soon confronted their own dilemma. on the one hand, redistributive 
policies were blocked by elites that had joined the anti-dictatorship 
coalition, a development that we have already discussed. At the same 
time, expansionary fiscal policies were discouraged by the World 
bank and the iMF. it soon became clear that what the multilateral 
agencies wanted them to do was to use their democratic legitimacy 
to impose structural adjustment programs. in Argentina, for instance, 
the international financial institutions pressured the new government 
of Raul Alfonsin to abandon neo-keynesian policies, implement tax 
reforms, liberalize trade, and privatize public enterprises. When the 
regime quailed, the World bank “concluded that the government had 
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not made sufficient progress toward its reform goals and suspended 
disbursements on a structural adjustment loan”. 
Electoral democracy became the prime mechanism for the impo-
sition of stabilization or structural adjustment programs in Jamaica, 
haiti. the Philippines, Peru, and Pakistan. in Jamaica, the progressive 
Manley government suffered a devastating loss of legitimacy when it 
caved in to pressure to impose an iMF stabilization program blessed by 
Washington. The program eroded living standards. it led to Manley’s 
crushing defeat in the 1980 elections by a successor who proceeded 
to continue the same policies at the behest of the iMF. in Peru, the 
government of Alberto Fujimori was elected on a populist, anti-iMF 
platform, but proceeded to impose a neoliberal “shock” programs that 
included steep price increases in the rates charged by state enterprises 
as well as radical trade liberalization (huber and stephens, 1997: 8). 
These measures provoked a deep recession, leading to popular discon-
tent that in turn provoked Fujimori to suspend the constitution, close 
Congress, and rule as a strongman with little respect for constitutional 
restraints. 
in the Philippines, the Us and the multilateral agencies aban-
doned Marcos. Not only was his political position untenable owing to 
massive popular resistance, but his government’s lack of legitimacy 
had made it an ineffective instrument for repaying the massive $28 
billion foreign debt and for implementing iMF stabilization poli-
cies. An economic crisis accompanied the end of the old regime, but 
that did not stop the World bank and the iMF from demanding that 
the fledgling democratic government of President Corazon Aquino 
make debt repayment its top national economic priority. People were 
shocked, and some of Aquino’s economic advisers protested, but the 
government submitted, issuing a decree that affirmed the “automatic 
appropriation” of the full amount needed to service the foreign debt 
from the budget of the national government. With some 40 to 50 per 
cent of the budget going to service the debt, this practically precluded 
national development, since all that was left went to salaries and op-
erational expenses, with little left over for capital expenditures. in 
some years, 10 per cent of the country’s GDP was spent servicing its 
foreign debt. Thus, it is hardly surprising then that the Philippines 
registered average growth of below 1.5 per cent per annum between 
1983 and 1993. 
it is ironic that today former President Aquino marches against 
President Arroyo when she herself was responsible for many economic 
policies, notably the model debtor policy, that Arroyo inherited. As in 
Peru, Argentina, and the Philippines, the return of democracy to bra-
zil was accompanied by scarcely veiled warnings from the iMF and 
Globalization and the Washington Consensus
140
the Us that the first order of business for the new regime was to ac-
complish what the exiting military regime had failed to do, that is, to 
impose stabilization programs raising interest rates, cutting back gov-
ernment expenditures, devaluing the currency, and liberalizing trade. 
From the mid-eighties to the 2002, a series of governments eroded the 
credibility of democracy by undertaking unsuccessful efforts to im-
pose on a recalcitrant population the economic stabilization desired 
by Washington and the iMF1. 
The latest victim is the government of “Lula” or Luis inacio da 
silva of the brazilian Workers’ Party, one of the most committed anti-
neoliberal parties on the continent. before he even won the presiden-
tial elections in the fall of 2002, Lula did the unprecedented in Latin 
America: he promised the iMF that he would honor the high- interest, 
expenditure-restrictive conditions of a stabilization loan negotiated 
with the outgoing President Fernando henrique Cardoso. Lula acted 
under duress. The Fund made it clear it would not release the remain-
ing $24 billion of the stabilization loan unless he behaved. 
Lula was true to his word. Consequently, in 2003 brazilian GDP 
contracted by 0.2 per cent in Lula’s first year; unemployment surged 
to a record 13 per cent. This bitter medicine for the brazilian people 
was, however, a tonic for foreign investors. in the first eight months 
of the year, even though the economy remained depressed, brazil-
ian stocks soared by over 58 per cent, prompting business Week to 
advise speculative investors: “Don’t leave this party yet”2 (business 
Week, 2003: 63). As for Lula, he faced mounting criticism from with-
in his own Workers’ Party and governing coalition as well as from 
ordinary voters; only 28 per cent of the population voicing support 
for his government (smith, 2004). in other words, even before the 
current crisis stemming from corruption among Lula’s closest advis-
ers, the government was already in trouble owing to its adoption of 
contractionary policies. 
Reversal of the third wave of democratization now looms as a 
threat throughout Latin America, where a poll conducted by the United 
Nations Development Program in 2004 that showed that 54.7 per cent 
of Latin Americans polled said they would support authoritarian re-
gimes over democracy if the shift would resolve their economic woes 
(Diamond, 2001: 358). 
in south Asia reversal of the third wave is already a reality. 
When Gen. Pervez Musharraf seized power in Pakistan in october 
1 see, among others, Geisa (2002: 5-33); also haggard and kaufman (1995: 193-
196, 209-211).
2 see also burbach (2004).
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1999, and sent the Prime Minister Nawaz sharaf packing, he ended 
11 years of unstable democracy. so worrisome to many orthodox 
students of democracy was Pakistan’s democratic breakdown that 
analyst Larry Diamond wrote: “Pakistan [may] not be the the last 
high-profile country to suffer a breakdown of democracy. indeed, if 
there is a ‘third reverse wave’, its origin may well be dated to 12 oc-
tober 1999” (kemal, 2001).
Post-mortems of Pakistan’s parliamentary democracy tend to fo-
cus on corruption, collapse of the rule of law, ethnic and religious 
polarization, and economic failure. other explanations center on an 
unaccountable military that had enjoyed special relations with the 
Pentagon owing to its key role in driving the Russians out of Afghani-
stan. Certainly, all this played a part. but also crucial was the role 
played by the iMF and World bank, which pushed the democratic 
regimes of both benazir bhutto and Nawaz sharif to impose stabiliza-
tion and structural adjustment programs that contributed significant-
ly to the rise of poverty and inequality as well as fall in the growth rate. 
(13) Noted one eminent Pakistani economist: “The almost obsessive 
concern with short-term macroeconomic stabilization has with it the 
danger [...] that some of our basic social programs might be affected, 
and this would have inter-generational consequences on development 
in Pakistan” (shore, 1999). since democracy became associated with 
a rise in poverty and economic stagnation, it is not surprising that the 
coup was viewed with relief by most Pakistanis, from both the middle 
classes and the working masses. 
The Challenge 
in a recent essay, the philosopher Richard Rorty sketches a bleak dys-
topian portrait of where Western democracy is headed: 
At the end of this process of erosion, democracy would have been re-
placed by something quite different. This would probably be neither 
military dictatorship nor orwellian totalitarianism, but rather a rela-
tively benevolent despotism, imposed by what would gradually become 
a hereditary nomenklatura. 
That sort of power structure survived the end of the soviet Union and 
is now resolidifying under Putin and his fellow kGb alumni. The same 
structure seems to be taking shape in China and in southeast Asia. 
in countries run in this way, public opinion does not greatly matter. 
Elections may still be held, but opposition parties are now allowed to 
pose any serious threat to the powers that be. Careers are less open 
to talent, and more dependent on connections with powerful persons. 
since the courts and police review boards are relatively powerless, it is 
often necessary for shopkeepers to pay protection money to the police, 
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or to criminals tolerated by the police, in order to stay in business. it is 
dangerous for citizens to complain about corruption about the abuse 
of power by public officials. high culture is restricted to areas that are 
irrelevant to politics [...] No more uncensored media. No more student 
demonstrations. Not much in the way of civil society. in short, a return 
to the Ancien Regime, with the national security establishment of each 
country playing the role of court in Versailles. (Rorty, 2004). 
This dark vision may not yet be applicable to western democracies, 
though some of my friends claim it is a perfect portrayal of Washing-
ton under the bush regime. it is, however, a credible end point if the 
forces that are eviscerating democracy are not subdued. This is not an 
unfamiliar vision. At the turn of the 20th century, Max Weber referred 
to the “iron cage” of bureaucratization and Robert Michels called at-
tention to the “iron law of oligarchy”. Today, the “iron cage” is being 
forged by a number of forces: bureaucratic centralization that has run 
out of control, the drive of a national security establishment playing 
on terrorist fears, corporate concentration and control of production 
and markets. in the case of the third world, one must add to this brew 
the draconian policies of powerful multilateral institutions and the 
systematic subversion of democratic mechanisms by local elites to 
gain a comprehensive picture of the threats that are strangling de-
mocracy globally. 
To respond to these threats we very badly need first of all a recon-
ceptualization or fundamental revisioning of democracy at various 
levels. Too long have we identified democracy with elections, so that 
once we had trooped to the polls and elected the people and party 
of our choice, we considered our democratic responsibilities fulfilled. 
Today, more than ever, today, Rousseau’s warning about representa-
tive systems being corrupted so that they generate the corporate will 
of the representatives rather than the general will of the represented 
remains very relevant. Today more than ever, Michels’ warning about 
elections becoming less a question of the people freely choosing their 
representatives than their so-called representatives using elections to 
maintain themselves in office rings true. Moving on boldly to innovate 
more direct and participatory methods of democratic governance is 
one of the key challenges facing all of us, and here the anti-globali-
zation movement with its emphasis of direct democratic methods of 
decisionmaking can be of great assistance to us. 
Then there is the challenge of how to restore equality as one of the 
key dimensions of democracy. We can no longer pretend that a func-
tioning democracy can be sustained when there is a formal equality of 
citizens but there are very real and large inequalities of wealth among 
them. We have seen both in the United states and in the developing 
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world the systematic perversion of democracy at every turn by money 
and wealth. Campaign finance reform is only a first step in reversing 
this trend. in my view, strengthening democracy is inseparable from 
achieving a more equitable distribution of assets and income--mean-
ing reversing the spontaneous drive of the market to create and per-
petuate inequalities. The disembedding of the market from society, 
to borrow an image from the great hungarian scholar karl Polanyi, 
in the name of efficiency and prosperity has been the greatest creator 
of inequality, the greatest subverter of democratic legitimacy in the 
last quarter of a century. We have relearned the hard way what we 
have been taught by the classic theorists of democracy-that you can-
not divorce equality from democracy. We have learned the hard way 
that, contrary to Milton Friedman’s classic dictum, market freedom 
translates to more freedom for corporations and more unfreedom for 
citizens. We must understand that the modus vivendi between democ-
racy and capitalism called Lockean democracy has long been dysfunc-
tional, and that to survive, contemporary democracy must break out 
of the rigid Lockean shell that now imprisons it. 
We must, above all, face the fact that capitalism and democratic 
deepening are no longer compatible, and that the challenge lies in the 
nature and degree of the restraints that we put on the market while 
we restructure the system of production and consumption around the 
satisfaction of the needs of people and the community rather than 
profitability. Call this participatory economics, social democracy, peo-
ple’s economics, or socialism-what is essential is that the market be 
drastically re-embedded in society, subject to the primordial human 
values of community, justice, equality, and solidarity. 
Then, finally, there is the challenge of reining in the big bureauc-
racies which have come to view themselves as above democratic poli-
tics. There are the corporate elites that say that achieving efficiency in 
production and distribution can only be achieved through hierarchi-
cal control –that democracy has to do strictly with political represen-
tation but stops at the realm of production; the technocratic elites that 
say that management of the modern state and economy is too complex 
for ordinary citizens and must be left to the experts; the national se-
curity elites that say that the exigencies of providing national security 
and carrying out contemporary warfare involving split– second deci-
sions necessitate a limitation of the classical freedoms of an earlier era 
and insulation of the national security establishment from what they 
disdainfully regard as the “vagaries” of civilian democratic politics. 
What is insidious about the behavior of these elites is that even as they 
quietly maintain that a technocratic centralization is the imperative 
of modern societies and that democratic practice must adjust this fact 
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of life, they opportunistically use the slogan of limiting and reducing 
government to hide their technocratic agenda. i am of course speak-
ing about the most influential sectors of the Republican Party of the 
Us, who cleverly use the Christian Right and the Cato institute small 
government types as canon fodder to advance their program of con-
servative centralization. 
Let me end by saying that with democracy facing a crisis glo-
bally, we cannot approach the problem as if it were simply one of 
tinkering with processes that are essentially sound and simply need 
sorting out. We are being faced with the classical questions of demo-
cratic theory, the fundamental questions, to which we must frame 
ideas and institutional solutions appropriate for the times. We must 
grasp and face with courage the full dimensions of the threat posed 
to democracy, for it is our ability to confront them that will provide 
the answer to the question of whether the global democratic revolu-
tion will deepen or it will become a thing of the past, leaving future 
historians, as Rorty puts it, with the puzzle why the golden age of 
democracy, like the age of the Antonines, lasted only about two hun-
dred years. 
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